Table of contents :
Epidemiology
: smallpox originated in Northeastern Africa around 10000 BC
(mummified remains of the 18th Egyptian dinasty (1580 to 1350
BC)
and of the better known Pharaoh Ramses V (1157
BC)).
An epidemic occurred in Athens in 430 BC and is described
by Thucydides. In 1096-1291 crusaders bring smallpox back to Europe and
between 1400 and 1800 fatalities routinely exceed 500,000 / yr. In 1520
smallpox caused collapse of naive Aztec and Incan Empires after arrival
of Spanish conquistadors and in 1763 it was first used as a bioweapon against
native American Indians.
-
last USA case occurred in 1949
In 1966 the WHO undertake a vaccination campaign to eradicate variola virus
by using anti-
Orthopoxvirus attenuated
vaccine
-
last India case occurred in 1975 (Saiban Bibi)
-
last worldwide natural infection : Ali Maow Maalin, a cook at the hospital
in Merca, Somalia, and sometime vaccinator, diagnosed as infectd by variola
minor virus on September 11, 1977, and declared recovered on October 26,
1977
-
last worldwide artificial infection : on August 1978, Janet Parker,
a 40-years old British photographer, became accidentally infected while
taking picture in a Birmingham University Medical School lab where some
samples were stored and used by the virologist Henry Bedson : the operation
of the air handling systems within the facility sucked the air in from
the laboratory to the floor above. The virologist committed suicide before
she died (she had been vaccinated 12 years before) and she infected (secondary
transmission) her father, who died probably not of smallpox but of a heart
attack, and her mother, the last person that we know of to have been infected
with variola virus, that survived. None of 290 other contacts, all of whom
were preventively vaccinated, became ill.
Below is the document signed on December 9, 1979, by members of the WHO
Global Commission, certifying that smallpox had been eradicated : the document
became public at the World Health Assembly on May 8, 1980.
Eradication was obtained thanks to :
-
absence of animal reservoir
-
absence of latent or persistent infections in humans (no healthy carriers)
-
easily and early recognition of symptoms, so that infected individuals
could be quarantined and their contacts vaccinated.
-
rare antigenic variation due to high replication fidelity of poxvirus DNA
polymerase
Genomics :
Proteomics :
-
smallpox inhibitor of complement enzyme (SPICE) is a co-factor for
factor
I
-mediated
degradation of both C3b and C4b.
-
IFN-g
receptor
-like
-
G4R/G2R ORF codes for a TNF decoy similar to TNFRII
Environmental resistance :
-
historical books written about smallpox virus and the vaccine virus, vaccinia
virus, suggests that these viruses could remain viable at room temperature
or its equivalent for 2-3 weeks only outside of infected individuals.
Variola virus inoculation by scabs stuffed into the nose was first started
in the Far East, and by inference, the scab was the result of crusting
of acute smallpox pustules. Inoculation of smallpox from an infected person
to one who had never been exposed to smallpox was started in the Middle
East with fresh "matter" taken directly from true smallpox lesions. There
are no reports of inoculations from material older than new scabs or crusts
-
in the late 1960s, a study published by the World Health Organization used
scabs stored in envelopes to show that the virus stayed viable that
way for at least 13 years, likely longer.
-
smallpox scabs stored in cotton at room temperature, a relative humidity
of 55-75% (the virus does not survive for long periods at customary
ambient temperatures in aerosol, inversely proportional to both temperature
and humidity), and in indirect sunlight still were viable after 18 months.
Thus the virus does not appear to survive, even under optimal conditions,
for > 2 years.
-
vaccinia virus could be stored in glycerol for long periods of time.
-
however, there are no reported experiments or observations that directly
focus on how long smallpox material can remain infectious outside of the
body; it could, however, only infect humans
-
one of the reasons smallpox was eventually eradicated was that there is
no human carrier state, meaning that spread was almost always by aerosol
during epidemics. Smallpox infection has not been contracted from old mass
grave
sites of persons who died from smallpox, or potentially infected environmental
surfaces known to be exposed to smallpox material that remained for extended
periods of time. There was no evidence for the virus lurking in graves,
although linen and scabs might survive for a time in vaults above ground
: after a cemetery in Quebec which harbored victims of the epidemics of
1650 and 1708 was disturbed in 1854 in order to build sewers, smallpox
broke out in its neighborhood, but this was probably just a coincidence.
In 1985 it was suggested that smallpox could live as long as a century
in the crypts of victims interred in cool, dry climatesref1,
ref2,
ref3,
ref4.
In view of the ability of poxviruses to retain infectivity for long periods
(possibly decades) in desiccated scabs, it has been suggested that viable
smallpox virus or fragments of its intact genomic nucleic acid, might be
recoverable from centuries-old cadavers or preserved medical specimens,
or alternatively from frozen corpses in the Arctic : so far these predictions
have not been fulfilled. Examination of skin lesions from the mummified
body of a 16th century Neapolitan child clearly revealed distinctive smallpox-like
lesions and poxvirus-like particles by electron microscopy and so it was
inferred that this child had died of a severe form of smallpox : however,
neither infectious virus, specific antigen, nor recognizable genomic material
could be demonstratedref.
Several years ago in Kentucky a construction crew unearthed a metal coffin
containing the mummified corpse of an apparent smallpox victim that researchers
traced to the mid-1800s : the CDC checked the tissue for live virus and
came up empty
-
on 31 March 2003 the 23-year-old librarian Susanne Caro in the College
of Santa Fe's Fogelson Library found a small, yellowed envelope tucked
between the pages of a 1888 book on Civil War medicine, with the
inscription "scabs from vaccination of W.B. Yarrington's children" in the
corner, with the signature "Dr. W.D. Kelly," the book's author. He had
done work on childhood vaccinations in the late 1800s and during the late
1800s, pus or bits of scabs from smallpox patients with mild cases were
implanted in the skins of healthy people to generate a mild illness that
bestowed lifetime immunity. It will be interesting to learn in due course
whether the contents of the envelope are indeed smallpox scabs, and whether
any infectivity has survived.
Transmission :
inhalatory (saliva droplets) or percutaneous route (rarely from scabs
ref
due to tightly binding in its fibrin matrix); this is an anthroponosis
with no known reservoir
Pathogenesis
: typically enters the host through the oropharynx, invades the mucosal
epithelium, and migrates to regional lymph nodes => asymptomatic viremia
=> multiplication of virus in the spleen, the bone marrow and other lymph
nodes, where viral replication occurs => secondary viremia
ref.
After an incubation period of 12–14 days, virus enters the blood within
leukocytes, which seed the skin and produce the characteristic skin lesions
(pox), whereas most other tissues are spared. The fact that virus seems
to travel in leukocytes that specifically exit blood vessels in the papillary
dermis indicates that variola virus preferentially associates with leukocytes
that can home to skin; alternatively, it might be that only skin tissues
can support the subsequent replication steps that are required for lesion
formation.
Symptoms &
signs :
ordinary
smallpox / Kaffir pox (a.k.a.
vaiolo in Italy;
poc
or
pocca = a bag or pouch; as opposed to
great
pox or syphilis) => 7-17 days incubation => 2-5 days with high
fever
,
malaise, prostration,
headache
and backache => infected macrophage in small vessels of the dermis migrate
into and infect basal layers of the epidermis => necrosis and edema =>
maculopapular
exanthema
on mouth and oropharynx (=>
ulcer
=> saliva =>
contagion source, expecially in the first week of illness,
after onset of rash), face, forearms => trunk and legs, all at the same
stage of development =>
vesicular within 48 hrs => round and tense
pustule
deeply embedded in the dermis => about 8 days after onset of the rash,
the pustules dry up and become
crusts by day 14 => by the end of
the third week crusts detach leaving pigment-free
pockmark (a depressed
scar). 33% lethality within 2 weeks due to :
-
overwhelming viremia (=> confluent, flat, or malignant smallpox
: severe toxemia and delayed appearance of the skin lesions, which were
commonly flat and solid; 70-80% lethality)
-
type III hypersensitivity
(=> MOF)
-
encephalitis

-
internal (mainly gastrointestinal) hemorrhages in immunocompromised hosts
(fulminant or hemorrhagic smallpox from strain Harvey : bleeding
from the conjunctiva and mucous membranes, very severe toxemia, and early
100% lethality
-
before onset of the rash (early type)
-
after the rash appears (late type)
Blindness was a rare complication, usually occurring in cases where there
was malnutrition and/or a secondary bacterial infection. Cases of smallpox
among pregnant women often resulted in spontaneous
abortion of the
fetus or a stillborn infant with evidence of lesions on the skin.
Whitepox is the name given to 4 isolates alleged to derive from
kidneys of African monkeys and
Rodentia
in the early 1970s, which are distinguishable by Variola virus only for
inducing white pocks in chorioallantoic membrane : no taxonomy allocation
as been purposed.
A milder form of disease was seen among those who had partial immunity
:
-
those who had been vaccinated many years earlier (varioloid / modified
smallpox : skin lesions evolve quickly and are more variable in size)
-
individuals affected by Variola minor virus (alastrim / Cuban itch)
Depending on whether the rash is present and its density, this variety
is divided into 4 types :
-
variola sine eruptione : no rash occurs in individuals with
good immunity
-
confluent smallpox
-
discrete smallpox
-
semiconfluent smallpox
Variola virus did not persist in the body after recovery. Upon recovery,
neutralizing antibodies were long-lasting, whereas HA-inhibiting antibodies
declined to low levels within 5 years, and complement-fixing antibodies
rarely persisted for longer than 6 months. Little is known about the development
of CMI.
Probability of infection for unvaccinated close contacts = 40-90%.
Complications :
Therapy :
-
attenuated
vaccination
within 4 days (as antibody response after primary vaccination usually occurs
4 to 8 days earlier than the response after naturally acquired smallpox
infection). In the second half of incubation period IFNs-mediated interference
by the already established variola virus prevent the less virulent vaccinia
virus from establishing itself.
-
IV cidofovir
or PO HDP-cidofovir
-
methisazone
was once used with poor results
-
the Poxviridae family members vaccinia and variola virus enter mammalian
cells, replicate outside the nucleus and produce virions that travel to
the cell surface along microtubules, fuse with the plasma membrane and
egress from infected cells toward apposing cells on actin-filled membranous
protrusions. Cell-associated enveloped virions (CEV) use Abl- and Src-family
tyrosine kinases for actin motility, and that these kinases act in a redundant
fashion, perhaps permitting motility in a greater range of cell types.
Additionally, release of CEV from the cell requires Abl- but not Src-family
tyrosine kinases, and is blocked by STI-571
,
an Abl-family kinase inhibitor used to treat chronic myelogenous leukemia
in humans. STI-571 reduces viral dissemination by 5 orders of magnitude
and promotes survival in infected mice, suggesting possible use for this
drug in treating smallpox or complications associated with vaccination.
This therapeutic approach may prove generally efficacious in treating microbial
infections that rely on host tyrosine kinases, and, because the drug targets
host but not viral molecules, this strategy is much less likely to engender
resistance compared to conventional antimicrobial therapiesref.
Although the preventive use of smallpox vaccination has been well documented,
little is known about its efficacy when used after exposure to the virus.
Here we compare the effectiveness of (1) post-exposure smallpox vaccination
and (2) antiviral treatment with either
cidofovir
or with a related acyclic nucleoside phosphonate analogue (HPMPO–DAPy)
after lethal intratracheal infection of cynomolgus monkeys (
Macaca fascicularis)
with monkeypox virus (MPXV). MPXV causes a disease similar to human smallpox
and this animal model can be used to measure differences in the protective
efficacies of classical and new-generation candidate smallpox vaccines.
Initiation of antiviral treatment 24 h after lethal intratracheal MPXV
infection, using either of the antiviral agents and applying various systemic
treatment regimens, resulted in significantly reduced mortality and reduced
numbers of cutaneous monkeypox lesions. In contrast, when monkeys were
vaccinated 24 h after MPXV infection, using a standard human dose of a
currently recommended smallpox vaccine (Elstree-RIVM), no significant reduction
in mortality was observed. When antiviral therapy was terminated 13 days
after infection, all surviving animals had virus-specific serum antibodies
and antiviral T lymphocytes. These data show that adequate preparedness
for a biological threat involving smallpox should include the possibility
of treating exposed individuals with antiviral compounds such as cidofovir
or other selective anti-poxvirus drugs
ref
At a meeting in Geneva on 4-5 Nov 2004, the Advisory Committee on Variola
Virus Research voted to recommend approval for genetically altering the
smallpox virus with GFP to speed up the screening of anti-smallpox drugs
and help to use up the last remaining stocks of the virus. In practice
the proposal will first be seen by the WHO executive board and director
general before it is considered by the World Health Assembly in May 2005.
the marker would accelerate screening by factors of 10 or 100. It would
also reduce the amount of time that lab workers would need to be in BSL-4
labs handling live variola virus. The committee's first proviso for its
recommendation is that the research must only be done in the 2 laboratories
currently handling live variola, at the CDC in the USA and at Novosibirsk
in Russia. The second is that the proposal must also be put to the relevant
institutional and national safety committees and submitted to the scientific
subcommittee of the Advisory Committee on Variola Virus Research. According
to WHO, the committee requested more detailed research proposals and a
full safety assessment. There is some concern about the stability of the
large virus and a small risk of increasing virulence. The committee also
made at least 6 other research recommendations that would allow labs around
the world to work with fragments of the variola virus as large as 20% of
the whole genome : some consider this a problem because different labs
with different chunks "would only have to link them together, and it would
be a lot easier" to recreate the entire smallpox genome than it would be
to synthesize it. They believe a 10–15% threshold would be preferable because
the 20% threshold corresponds to about 37,000 bp, a too large a number.
The proposals would also permit the 2 smallpox repository labs—one at the
CDC and the other at Novosibirsk in Russia—to insert variola genes one
at a time into other viruses in the orthopox family, like monkey pox and
cowpox, to create a better model for drug screening, as they can be worked
on at lower containment levels than the BSL-4 that smallpox requires, but
anyway at one higher BSL than each orthopox virus normally requires. 2
other recommendations would allow the Russian and American teams to share
their smallpox samples with one another for the first time and to perform
experiments on variola and other orthopox viruses simultaneously, provided
the work is performed at BSL-4. Another 2 propose that other researchers
elsewhere be permitted to synthesize smallpox fragments up to 500 bp in
their labs but prohibited from synthesizing longer ones and, with microarrays,
permitted to include the whole variola genome, just as long as individual
array fragments are no longer than 80 bp. The 6 recommendations the committee
approved last week were all proposed by its technical subcommittee in 2003ref.
The World Health Organization (WHO) announced on Fri 18 May 2007 that
it is postponing for at least 4 years any decision on when to destroy the
world's last known stockpiles of smallpox virus, a deadly virus eradicated
nearly 30 years go. There is no treatment for the viral disease that killed
millions of people a year as recently as the 1960s and left many more blind
and scarred. In 1979, it became the 1st disease officially stamped out
after a worldwide vaccination campaign. The United States and Russia, however,
which hold the only known stockpiles of the virus in high-security laboratories,
have long resisted calls to destroy them in case smallpox is found to exist
elsewhere. The 60th annual World Health Assembly, the top decision-making
body of the United Nations agency, reaffirmed a previous commitment to
destroy the remaining stockpiles, but agreed to postpone any decision on
when this should happen until its 2011 meeting. In 2010, the WHO secretariat
will carry out a review of all research undertaken and still planned, in
order that the 64th World Health Assembly may reach global consensus on
the timing of the destruction of existing variola smallpox virus stocks.
A previous 2002 deadline for destroying smallpox virus was delayed by WHO
until new vaccines or treatments for smallpox were found, after the United
States said it would keep stocks on hand to combat any re-emergence of
the
disease. That decision was made in the wake of the "September 11" suicide
plane attacks on the United States, which stirred fears that deadly viruses
could fall into the hands of terrorist groupsref.
Experimental
animal models : none except IV inoculation in monkeys.
It is considered by CDC as a category A biological
weapon
.